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JPRS L/9251

13 August 1980

# Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 30/80)



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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND FATAH ANALYZED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Jun 80 pp 20-21

[Article: "Fatah and the Syrian-Palestinian Complex"]

[Text] During the past few years, Syrian-Palestinian relations have alternated between one extreme and the other due to several factors. Perhaps the most important of these are the intervention in the Lebanese arena, on the one hand, and the Syrian domestic situation on the other. This report, which AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI received from its special correspondent in Damascus, uncovers some of the details surrounding the tension and misunderstanding which have characterized these relations during the recent phase.

A few months ago, Syrian-Palestinian relations entered a lukewarm phase. The two sides wished to avoid airing the details and causes of this development, and both sought to surround the matter with secrecy fearing that the differences might turn into something of a confrontation which could not be easily contained or overcome.

Recently, Yasir 'Arafat, head of the PLO Executive Committee, was able to restore these relations to a semblance of normality following his meetings with President Hafiz al-Assad. But this did not last long. Relations between the two sides soon began to decline once more.

What are the reasons for this conflict? Will the continuing mediation efforts succeed in containing it? What is the cost of a return to normal relations between Fatah and Syria, and then between Syria and the PLO?

Arab diplomatic sources say that the Syrian Government withdrew a number of the special travel permits which had been furnished to leaders of the Fatah movement, the largest, strongest, most influential and most independent of the Palestinian organizations. Moreover, it prohibited several of these leaders from entering Syrian territory across the authorized military lines and subjected them to the Syrian General Security centers located in the al-Masna' area on the Lebanese-Syrian border.

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These sources add that this measure came on the eve of the Fourth General Conference of the Fatah movement held in Damascus on 22 May.

#### Accusations and Arrests

These measures were accompanied by other indication which revealed the degree to which the confrontation between the two sides had escalated. These indications included the following:

1. The attack launched by the Syrian newspaper AL-BA'ATH against a number of Fatah leaders in which it accused them of joining the Camp David conspiracy and working to eliminate the Palestinian struggle. This attack was the culmination of a Syrian campaign against the Fatah movement, and a number of Lebanese Nationalist Movement leaders.
2. The repetition of claims by the Phalangist radio, "Voice of Lebanon," that Fatah's number two man Abu Iyad, had visited Cairo and met with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and that he had made contacts with 'Umar al-Muhishi, the Libyan officer who is now living in Egypt because of a coup he attempted against President Qadhafi some years ago. This information campaign was launched following the Phalangist delegation's visit to Damascus.
3. The cancellation of the meeting which had been scheduled between President Hafiz Assad and Yasir 'Arafat as part of the tour which Abu 'Ammar made to several of the Arab states. It was reported at the time that the meeting had been cancelled because of the likelihood that a mini-summit would be held among Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the PLO.
4. The arrest of "Abu Isamah," the financial officer of the Fatah movement in Syria, on the charge of transferring funds from Jordan to the Moslem Brotherhood group in Damascus, Hamah and Aleppo. The Syrian authorities say that "Abu Isamah" admitted to transferring the funds, but denied that he supported the Moslem Brotherhood movement in Syria.

The arrest of the Palestinian official followed the arrest of his deputy in Fatah's financial department in Damascus, "Abu Mundhir." It was reported that Abu Mundhir confessed to recruiting a number of Moslem brothers and inciting them to carry out terrorist operations. Interrogations of the deputy led to the exposure of a network of the Brotherhood's secret organization and the arrest of seven individuals in Damascus who had reportedly been making preparations for bombings in the Syrian capital.

5. The insistence of Syrian officials on a number of occasions that the Fatah movement define its position and activities in the Arab-Israeli struggle and reject everything which would tend to perpetuate good relations with Arab states outside the framework of the "Steadfastness and Resistance Front." [Foreign] Minister Khaddam conveyed this message to the Soviet ambassador in Damascus, who had tried to mediate between the two sides.

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6. The widening of the conflict between Syria and the Fatah movement following the Tripoli conference and Damascus' adoption of a formula opposing Morocco's efforts to deal with the greater Sahara problem. The resistance backed off from the resolution which the Tripoli summit is reported to have adopted concerning recognition of the POLISARIO.

7. Syrian silence on the efforts to fabricate a clash between the Fatah movement and the Shi'ite Amal movement in Lebanon, and the Syrians' refusal to mediate to establish better relations between the two movements. Palestinian sources say that such behavior aroused fears that a clash might develop between Fatah and other forces close to the regime in Syria.

Given these signs which Arab diplomatic sources in Beirut perceive as indicative of the nature of relations between Syria and the Fatah movement, will the situation be pushed beyond the point of no return?

#### Fatah Does Not Approve of Escalation or Containment

Palestinian sources say that the Syrian officials' approach to the actions of some Fatah leaders in the context of the Moslem Brotherhood's activities appears to be correct, and that the Fatah movement does not approve of participation by its members in activities and actions of this type. But neither does Fatah approve of this position being turned into a confrontation against the Fatah movement and the Plo or a containment operation in the middle of the meetings of the Fatah movement general conference in the Syrian capital.

The Palestinian sources say that the Fatah movement was determined to hold its conference in Damascus despite everything that occurred to relations with Damascus. They indicate that Abu 'Ammar rejected the use of a boycott because of the possibility that such a move might have led to an escalation of the conflict. This in turn could have had an adverse effect on the conditions of the resistance and the methods and means of armament, transport and movement which Damascus provides to the Palestinian platoons.

Abu 'Ammar tried to deal with the question of relations in his meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam during Fatah's general conference. According to informed sources, Khaddam asked 'Arafat to issue a statement on the Fatah movement defining the options among the Arab axes. However, 'Arafat told him that the resistance did not want to be a side among the Arab regimes, and that it was President Assad himself who had told him on previous occasions that it was the openness of the resistance to the Arab regimes that had made it capable of life.

'Arafat added that the present role of the resistance is to restore understanding among the Arab regimes, because a unified Arab position would help provide a boost to the resistance in both the Arab and international frameworks.

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Palestinian circles sense that the Fatah movement is willing to sacrifice some of its members accused of cooperating with the Moslem Brotherhood on the condition that the Syrian campaigns and the attempts to contain independent Palestinian decision-making are halted. These circles say that the resistance could possibly help Syria achieve a unified resistance provided that Damascus does not ask Fatah to reform its political and military cadres and expel some of its leaders.

In Damascus, Syrian officials are looking to the formula approved by the Fatah conference to achieve national unity among the various segments of the resistance in the hope that relations with the Fatah movement will be restored to their normal level. Syrian sources told me that Fatah's sanctioning of a plan to escalate terrorist action in the interior and its adoption of a hardline position on diplomatic action to solve the Palestinian problem could be the avenues to a restoration of understanding between the two sides.

According to these sources, Abu Iyad's announcement shortly before the Fatah general conference that the resistance would adhere to the resolutions of the Tripoli conference was an attempt to gather around the arena of the Arab struggles. Although this did not keep the newspaper AL-BA'Ath from launching an attack against a number of Fatah officials, the Syrian sources felt that everything that was said in this connection was aimed at exerting media pressure on the eve of the general conference.

#### Repercussions of the Situation of Lebanon

Palestine sources feel that the situation in Lebanon could lead to an increase in the level of tension between Syria and Fatah. These sources say that the nature of the Israeli attack on resistance positions necessitated the adoption of decisions pertaining to the protection of the Palestinian camps and relocation to positions which could be effectively defended against Israeli attacks. This led Fatah to adopt measures which the Syrian officials may consider an attempt to regroup the Palestinian military forces in the areas and the capital city of Beirut.

The Palestinian sources fear that this situation may lead to Palestinian rigidity in the efforts which may be undertaken in cooperation with Damascus to make new military and security arrangements in Beirut and its suburbs. However, the Syrian sources say that understanding between Syrian officials and the military leaders in Fatah is not a problem because both sides realize the critical nature of the circumstances surrounding them in Lebanon.

Based on this, the informed sources expect that the conclusion of the Fatah conference will be the beginning of an effort to restore relations between Syria and the resistance to normal so that neither side will neglect the requirements of the confrontation with the Camp David alliance.

The beginning of this understanding was the release of "Abu Isamah" following his arrest and interrogation in Damascus. According to the Palestinian sources, 'Arafat informed the Syrian officials that he would impose a just sentence on the accused.

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In any case, Arab diplomats here feel that this understanding may be temporary, because a number of unsolved problems are still smoldering underneath the ashes. They feel that the dispute may have been avoided at this time because of the two sides' desire to maintain balance during the anticipated period of deadlock in the Middle East crisis.

One expert on Syrian-Palestinian relations says that they usually reach the very brink of the precipice and then observers are surprised by a rapid return to honeymoon status. Have the circumstances and givens changed to bring the current developments to the surface, or is the present situation a link in a chain which will inevitably end in a hard choice when the dawn of the Arab-Israeli struggle begins to break?

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

FATAH REAFFIRMS HARDLINE POSITION IN FOURTH CONFERENCE

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Jun 80 pp 22-24

[Article by Palestinian affairs editor: Fatah Report Reflects the Relentlessness of the Revolutionaries and the Failure of the Politicians' Hopes; Rejection of Dependency, Tutelage and Any Attempt to Prevent the Revolution From Acting Freely Among Its Masses; The Goal: Liberation of Palestine, Elimination of Israel, Establishment of a Palestinian State and Use of Armed Struggle"]

[Text] The report issued by the fourth conference of the Palestinian organization Fatah reflects the climate surrounding the Middle East problem, which is characterized by stalemate and a sense of bitterness on the part of the Palestinians in the face of continued denial of their rights by the United States and Israel. In addition, the report reflects the climate of failure surrounding the Camp David approach despite the many concessions made by the Egyptian regime. Thus, the report confirms the Palestinians' firm stance rejecting any settlement at the expense of their cause and their rights. It calls for the total liberation of Palestine and the elimination of the Zionist entity. This entity is to be replaced by a democratic Palestinian state encompassing all Palestinian territory and for all people without distinction. The report also reaffirms the use of the method of armed popular revolution as a means to regain the land.

Also reaffirmed was the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of any Arab country, coupled with the rejection of tutelage, dependency, intervention in the internal affairs of the revolution, or any attempt to exclude it from operating freely among its masses in their areas of concentration.

The Fatah general conference came 9 years after the last conference and was preceded by preparations which took more than a year and involved dozens of meetings. The most recent of these was the meeting of the movement's Central Committee in Beirut, which continued day and night for more than 10 days.

The third general conference was convened in a climate set by the blow dealt to the movement and the Palestinian revolution bloc in Jordan in September 1970. The atmosphere at that time was dominated by criticism, self-criticism and examination of the course of the movement from its beginnings to its emergence from the hollows and woods of Jarash.

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Perhaps the most important things produced by that third conference were, first, the healing of wounds, and, secondly, the rejection of the call that had arisen--particularly outside Fatah--urging that the fedayeen organizations be transformed into political parties. The conferees were adamant on the necessity of continuing the armed struggle, and it was during this time that 'Arafat uttered his famous cry: "The mountain...the mountain." This was the beginning of a transformation not only in the history of Fatah, but in the history of the entire northern front surrounding Jabel al-Shaykh, particularly in south Lebanon.

At that time, the conference created a central committee which included Abu 'Ammar, Abu Jihad, Abu Iyad, Khalid al-Hasan, Abu Yusuf al-Najjar, Kamal 'Adwan, Abu Mazin, Abu Salih and Abu al-Lutf. Following the deaths of Abu Yusuf and Kamal 'Adwan in 1973, Abu Mahir, Abu al-Hul and Abu-al-Adib were added to the committee, and Abu al-Lutf was elected secretary of the committee.

On the occasion of these changes, a revolutionary council was formed from individuals who can be considered Fatah's second rank. However, this council remained limited in its influence on the Central Committee.

#### The Difference Over the Years

In this fourth conference, the Fatah organization may have revealed the big difference between the state of the movement 9 years ago and its present state. The growth which Fatah and the Palestinian revolution in general have experienced during the last decade is almost legendary. This applies to all levels, in both qualitative and quantitative terms.

The size of the organization has grown and developed, and the military forces and cadres have also grown. Fatah's sphere of influence has widened as a result of the many centers and organizations that have come into existence and attracted thousands of Palestinians.

Naturally, this growth has been accompanied and sustained by the moral and political victories that the revolution has won under Fatah's leadership, making the Palestinian problem the most disturbing problem in the world and the most serious threat to peace.

Therefore, it was only natural that the conference should postpone its meeting time until the piles of accumulated dossiers had all been studied. The examination of these documents has meant criticism, self-criticism and long and persistent study of the course of the struggle over the past 9 years. And as we have seen, these have not been normal years, at least with regard to the Palestinian people and the changes which have occurred in their cause. These changes include, to mention a few, the October 1973 war, the subsequent maneuvers and plots of Kissinger, the war in Lebanon, and Sadat's break with the Arab strategy and his visit to Jerusalem, followed by his signing of the peace agreement with the Begin Government.

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Fatah differs in its origin, make-up and methods of interaction from other well known organizations and parties in our big Arab homeland. Despite the climates and forces that have surrounded Fatah, most of which have been similar in terms of organization, the movement has remained distinct from other organizations in this respect.

Fatah was not dedicated merely to surviving in the Palestinian arena, but was able to become the leading organization in this arena. It has not undergone a single split since its formation, and the few who have broken with it and rebelled against it--and they can be counted on the fingers of one hand--have not been able to hold out in the field or impair its unity.

Observers are at a loss to provide a real explanation for this. They say that a long time must pass before the observer can write a history--from a knowledgeable position--of the course of this movement, especially in the context of its internal organizational relations.

In explanation of this, the Fatahists say that the matter is extremely simple and does not involve any secrets or mysteries. They list the following reasons:

--First, the Fatahists say that what binds them together-- and has bound them together from the start--is "Palestine," which they have evaluated above every slogan, opinion or organization. Palestine, i.e., the struggle for Palestine, was the reason and purpose for their coming together. It is the norm and standard for them as well as other political forces active locally, in the Arab world, and in the international scene.

They sum this up by saying: "Anyone who supported Palestine in word or in deed was, according to our conviction, a friend, brother and ally."

These Fatahists furnish many examples in their favor and against those who reproach Fatah for its links with so-called "conservative regimes." They say that even if their relations with these regimes are no longer good for the movement, but were in the past, they at least assured the neutralization of these regimes. They add: "At any rate, our relations with the conservative regimes have not prevented us from establishing the best of relations with the progressive, socialist and communist regimes."

The Fatahists are proud on this count, and say: "Perhaps the relationship of our movement in particular with the socialist states--and especially the Soviet Union--are stronger than those between these states and some of our brothers who reproach us for our relations with the conservative states."

The truth in this regard is that Fatah has been able to shuffle the Arab cards and has made the issue of Palestine the basic standard for what is nationalistic and progressive and what is said to be conservative.

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Dialog of the Right and Left Within the Movement

--Second, the Fatahists say: "Because Palestine is the key and the cornerstone, we do not make membership in the organization conditional on any certain ideology, either right-wing or left-wing. Our formation came about to convey an objective picture of the true state of our people, whose primary motivation was the cause of their country and their countrymen, no matter what parties and ideas they embraced."

Thus, the "right and left" within the movement--which do exist-- carry on a dialog in a language which is not the traditional language of the right and left outside the movement. No matter how much their colors may vary, Fatah's flowers remain its own and stay within the garden of the organization.

--Third, the Fatahists maintain that they are adherents of democracy, and say: "This is our organization. Show us another organization like it or better than it in terms of the degree of freedom enjoyed by the Fatahist in his criticism of and opposition to the leadership. In fact, this freedom occasionally reaches the point of open comments and head-butting outside the cadres of the organization. Criticism does not frighten us. On the contrary, it increases our strength and power. Criticism from within gives us the power to withstand opposition from the outside and makes us better prepared to respond to such opposition."

--Fourth, all Fatahists--whatever their differences--insist on frequent reiteration of what they have termed the "law of love" among them. The Fatahists have a red line which they cannot cross, which is to strike at their brother treacherously. Say what you want, but it must be within the framework of the law of love.

--Fifth: One point which is not made by the Fatahists alone but is borne out by testimony from outside the organization is that from the beginning the Fatahists have made their organization one of service to the people. The doors to Fatah are open to everyone, not just the members of the organization. When a majority of the Palestinian people were unorganized-- in spite of their membership in the revolution--these masses found their needs met in Fatah more than in any other organization. Meanwhile, the other organizations--perhaps due to inability--could not respond to any needs beyond those of their card-carrying members.

Role of Abu 'Ammar

--Sixth, Abu 'Ammar, a son of Fatah, has been able to make himself a symbol of the Palestinian people's struggle. This has profited Fatah and the Fatahists, including those among them who can be regarded as not among Abu 'Ammar's ardent supporters. It is certain that Abu 'Ammar has also benefited from this situation. But he really deserves to benefit, because this role did not descend on him out of the clear blue sky but was the result of persistent hard work, an incessant struggle and a total devotion

which has continued now for over 20 years. If we are willing to concede that the Palestinian people, like other Arab and Third World peoples, still belong to the "patriarchal" or tribal type which needs a "father," then Abu 'Ammar has been able to fill this vacuum and become the "father" of his people.

For these reasons--and there are perhaps others, but they would take additional time to explain--Fatah has been able to remain steadfast, grow, maintain its organizational unity, take over the reins of leadership in the Palestinian arena, and gain a influence in the Arab and international spheres.

Anyone who knows what the Palestinian community was like before Fatah and compares it with the Palestinian community of today cannot deny what Fatah has done to restructure this community on the basis of equalities which have no connection with what was traditional during the days of persons of rank, leading personalities and great family names. Thus, the Palestinian people today have become more attached to their movement names than to their real names, and there is no longer anyone who can lead because of what he "was." He must give in order to "become."

At this point, it must be mentioned that Fatah has been able to gain the recognition of other Palestinian organizations as a leading organization. This has not been an easy matter. However, the series of actions which Fatah has employed--both in the struggle against the main enemy, Zionist Israel, and in responding to interpretations and explanations in the Palestinian arena--has been the mainstay that has secured the positive relations which now exist between Fatah and the other organizations.

The Fatahists say: "Our newspapers and magazines since our formation testify that we have not encroached on anyone and that we have not responded even when we have been insulted intentionally or unintentionally by our brothers and comrades. We have always been conscious that unity in the Palestinian arena is the condition for victory."

It is the same on the Arab level as it is on the local level. The balance of relations between Fatah and the Arab states lies more toward the positive side than the negative, despite the crises which have befallen relations here and there along the line of march. Without a doubt, this has also boosted Fatah to a position of preeminence from the standpoint of Arab-Palestinian interaction in general.

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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

LIBYAN CONSTRUCTION OF AIRFIELD IN MAURITANIA RE-ALLEGED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Jul 80 p 8

[Article: "For Lack of Argument"]

[Text] In the column, "Confidential," of JA No 1015, we announced that Libya had a secret airport built in the region of Nema, in Mauritania, close to the Malian border, for the purpose of assuring the POLISARIO a weapons supply without going through Algeria.

One has to believe that this information did not please the leaders of Tripoli. Following is their literal "comment:" JAMAHIRIYA NEWS AGENCY [JANA]--FM/PL/YV--10.52.

Tripoli, 1st shaaban--14 June

The political editor of JANA refutes the invalidations (sic) spread by JEUNE AFRIQUE.

Corroboration

The political editor of JANA has refuted the information fabricated by a French magazine, entitled JEUNE AFRIQUE, which indicated that Libya has secretly built an airfield at the Mauritanian-Malian border. The JANA editor characterized this information as petty and false, and said that irrefutable proof of the magazine's pettiness and of its lie resides in the fact that it is connected with two western intelligence services, from which it draws its information.

According to the JANA political editor, the magazine persists in fighting against freedom, Islam, and progress.

This magazine, continues the editor, is known for its connections with western intelligence services, for the services that it renders imperialism in Africa, for the propaganda that it carries out against Islam and Moslems, for its defense of imperialist companies, for its justification of exploitation, dictatorship, reaction--and its opposition to freedom and progress."



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Let us forgive the "invalidations" (it is not certain, in view of what follows, that this is merely a typist's error); let us forgive the "petty information" (this adjective should be used in a more correct sense, since it is of Arabic origin); let us also forgive "French magazine"--(although being French--or Libyan--in itself is not defamatory.

Let us forgive the insult: it is the argument of one who does not have any argument and it better describes the one who does the insulting than it hurts the one at whom the insult is aimed. In the present case, there are some excuses for the anonymous "political editor"--note in passing the Soviet terminology: he is paid for that and he risks his life if he does not reflect "the voice of his master." Regardless of what he says and what his masters say, the people know, because one cannot fool them for long, that JEUNE AFRIQUE is more independent than Libya is.

Let us forgive all of that and let us get to the bottom of the matter. What is of most importance to the reader is to know if JEUNE AFRIQUE's information is true or not. The denial might have been convincing if, instead of being accompanied by insults, it had accompanied a challenge to prove the information or, at the very least, to present an argumentation.

For lack of that, our readers, as in our case, regard this as corroboration.

To this denial-corroboration we will add, for the edification of our reader, an explanation and an argument:

1 - We explain that we did not see the airfield with our own eyes. We based our information on the testimony of people of the area whom we trust and who did see.

2 - In our opinion the decisive argument in favor of the truth of this information is that we knew why this airfield became useful and necessary: in case of need, to dispense with Algerian territory and the facilities that up to now have been liberally granted by Algeria to Libya and to the POLISARIO for the purpose of allowing men and weapons to go to the Western Sahara.

#### Independent Action


The Gafsa operation (27 January) in fact led the Algerian government to sometimes drastically limit the coming and going over its territory, and consequently the utilization by Libya and the POLISARIO of "the Qadhdhafi lane."

In anticipation of a possible tightening of this control, Libya undertook to build this airfield, in order to be in a position to "hop over" the

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Algerian territory and to continue the war--alone, if necessary.

Let us recall that JEUNE AFRIQUE revealed the existence of the Qadhadhafi lane, the Libyan maneuvers against Mali, the participation of Libya in the operation against Gafsa...etc.; and that our disclosures, without exception, have been confirmed by events.



The Qadhadhafi lane revealed by JEUNE AFRIQUE--and the Nema airfield.

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AFGHANISTAN

ON-THE-SPOT OBSERVATIONS OF FRENCH DEPUTY, SCIENTIST

Soviet Presence Analyzed

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 7 Jul 80 pp 30-32

[Text] "What is being played out in Afghanistan is the limit of our liberties." Adding a gesture to his words, Mr Alain Madelin traces a fast sketch: some circles which represent the different states of the Far East. For the young deputy of the Republican Party (PR), the military operations launched by the Vietnamese against Thailand from the Cambodian border are linked to the Afghan situation.

"By exerting pressures from Indochina and Afghanistan," he says, emphasizing India, "Moscow and its Vietnamese allies are counting on intimidating and neutralizing Pakistan, Burma and Thailand. Finding itself encircled, China should come to terms. What then will Europe, the little foreland of Asia, ponder?"

Elected in Redon in March 1978, Mr Madelin is 32 years old. He began fighting the communists at 16: upon leaving the lycée. Six months ago, last November, he was in Phnom Penh at the head of a group of 6 deputies, all of the French Democratic Union (UDF): he wanted to testify on the communist genocide; his testimony forced the international organizations to suspend food assistance which at that time was going only to the Vietnamese (our issue of 10 December).

He now relates what he saw in Afghanistan. He left 15 June with another deputy, Mr Gilbert Barbier, radical, elected in Dole. Their visas had been granted 2 days earlier with no problem. Their authority as members of the parliament from the president's party had sufficed.

"Kabul is not Phnom Penh," he says. "There are several weekly flights to New Delhi. Journalists may pass as long as they don't reveal their profession, with the exception of Coubard of L'HUMANITE, who is received by the Soviet Embassy's press attaché."

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The two deputies spent 2 days strolling through the city, then rented a car to reach Pakistan. Along the way there were some slight controls, but never a crowd. The exist visa is granted at the border without hindrance. Several thousand Afghan officials are not enough to control a country larger than France, Mr Madelin reports: "Kabul is not all fire and blood, nor is it encircled by the resistance. The Soviets are discreet, but they are billeted in the key sectors. Hundreds of tanks can be seen. Dozens of helicopters take off every morning for the antiguerrilla operations. In the evening enormous four-engined Antonov aircraft land every 10 minutes."

Twenty kilometers from the capital most of the villages are held at night-fall by the "mujahidins," the resistance fighters, who evacuate them at dawn. On the main roads, particularly in the mountain pass between Sarobi and Jalalabad, wrecks of vehicles litter the highway. There is one single military convoy per day, between 1200 and 1400 hours, with air cover and an armor escort. The resistance allows convoys of goods to pass.

"The Russians have failed politically," says Mr Madelin; "they are slipping militarily, so they are concentrating their effort in the diplomatic field."

The population's refusal has kept the pro-Soviet regime from installing the classic people's committees of the district and the village.

There is no national sentiment in Afghanistan, an entity formed in the last century by the Pashtun domination over the other tribes.

Another privileged witness, Mr Jean-Pierre Carbonnel, Director of the Permanent Mission of the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) in Afghanistan, notes that the Soviets could play on the antagonisms among the Tadzhiks and Uzbeks of the north, the Persian-speaking residents of Herat in the west, Pashtun nomads of the south and the east, Shi'ite Hazaras and those of Mongol origin in the central mountains. Yet the failure is total, states Mr Carbonnel: "For the Afghans, the Russians are 'kafirs', infidels. 'People with no book', atheists, they live like dogs," they say.

Instead of conciliating the peoples, the pro-Soviet regimes that have replaced one another have given chase to the mullahs and have made the nomads sedentary to the extent that Mr Carbonnel fears a veritable cultural genocide:

"Keeping the nomads from migrating," he says, "is changing their lifestyle. The nomadic women are not veiled; being sedentary, they are going to fall under the control of a rigorous urban Islam."

The manufacture of jewelry and rugs, the baking of bread, important cultural traits, are disappearing.

"The results of such practices can be seen in the Moslem republics of the Soviet Union," says Mr Carbonnel again. "The very structures of the sedentary

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and collectivist society in the area have killed off domestic craftsmen as a class. Only in the Tashkent Museum can one see Turkmenian embroidery work.

But on military terrain?

"Without sufficient manpower to cover the terrain in depth," says Mr Madelin, "the Soviets have resigned themselves to holding only the essential places. Fortunately for them, they have total air superiority."

The Red Army controls Kabul, the large cities and the strategic axes. Elsewhere, it is conducting mop-up operations without leaving troops in place.

What role does the resistance play? It multiplies the number of helping hands in the mountainous regions, it controls the villages clandestinely. In Kabul itself several criminal attempts take place during the day; at night, some informers have their throats cut, and mixed Soviet-Afghan patrols are attacked.

"One has to take things into consideration," relates the deputy from Redon. "Kabul is the city of rumors. People talk of cut-off heads in trunks, of soldiers chopped up into pieces. They claim that the Russians eat bananas with the peel."

The means of resistance are weak, for a lack of arms. A Kabul resister confided to the two French deputies: "We could get by with pistols equipped with silencers and with time bombs to perform efficiently in the city."

The Afghan capital is very vulnerable. Equipped with rocket launchers and modern rifles, commandos could strike the airport, destroy Microrayon, the Russian section from which the women have been evacuated. An embryo of diplomatic reconnaissance of the resistance movements that are attempting to unite and a regular supply of weapons via the Pakistani or Iranian borders would allow them to make heavy strikes against the Soviets.

That is why the latter, according to Mr Madelin, are seeking to remove the problem onto international terrain: "The simple fact of announcing that they face certain concessions gives the Russians an enormous advantage. The Western countries are telling themselves that they cannot arm the Afghan resistance at a time when Moscow is demonstrating good will.

A position which the chief of state (who speaks of "rebellion" and not of Afghan resistance) adopted in substance in his press conference of 26 June. The West's misreading of the exact situation on site is another advantage for the Russians. The French Government has not sent a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan for 2 years; with our ambassador having been recalled to Paris at the beginning of this year, the Quai d'Orsay keeps informed only by the dispatches of a charge d'affaires. And what has happened to our intelligence service.

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In the area certain cooperating Frenchmen are engaging in pro-Soviet propaganda that angers their compatriots. The occasional Kabul newspapers and Afghan television emphasize, furthermore, everything that can make France seem to be on the side of the Soviet Union: participation in the Moscow Games, the Giscard-Brezhnev meeting in Warsaw, French cosmonauts...

For Mr Madelin some aid, even slight, to the resistance would be enough to reverse the situation:

"We had come with the idea that the Russian steamroller was crushing everything. We went back thinking that nothing had been staked."

Mr Carbonnel is more pessimistic: "When they undertook to socialize Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Kazakhstan, the Russians ran into a resistance just as important as the one they are running into today in Afghanistan. That did not prevent them from creating the peoples' republics of Central Asia, of keeping a military presence there and from overcoming the resistance. The later resister was killed 20 years after the creation of these republics.

Mountain of Ores

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 7 Jul 80 p 32

"The energy potential of Afghanistan is considerable. Hence its importance for the Soviets." A French geologist has just spent five years living in that country. Mr Jean-Pierre Carbonnel, 43, research specialist at CNRS, directs the permanent mission of this organ in Afghanistan. He returned to France in April. He decided to speak out, He draws a lesson from his experience for VALEURS ACTUELLES."

"Afghanistan is presented as a poor desert land afflicted with farm problems. That's false. In fact, the energy resources are considerable. It is too often ignored because the Russians have put these resources on the back burner, so as to constitute an important potential of reserves. For 20 years the Afghan economy has been at the Soviet Union's elbow."

"How did you observe it?"

"Moscow has annexed entirely the mining inventory. Mining exploration is the monopoly of Soviet experts. One single foreign mission is working in this area: that of the CNRS, but in a context of basic research whose sole interest for the Afghan government was to serve as a base for Soviet applied research. In 1977 the petroleum concession that was allocated to us offered little of interest.

Long before the coup of 1978, the Afghan Ministry of Mines was lodging 250 Russian geologists. In Kabul there were 300 Soviet petroleum experts to one Frenchman. Not counting the 2000 technicians in the oil fields of the north based essentially in Magar [should be Mazar]-I-Sharif.

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Petroleum and gas were also under Soviet control long before 1978.

In 1965 the CNRS discovered the iron deposit of Hajagak. In volume and in quantity this open-air deposit is the most important in Asia, with an iron content of 72 percent and 5 centuries of reserves. Since the CNRS does not have exploitation as its mission, the Afghan government turned over the deposit to the Soviets who, after 14 years, have still not presented their conclusions concerning its exploitation."

"Always for the same motive: to have available there an enormous strategic reserve?"

"Exactly. But that's not all. Afghanistan is a veritable mountain of ores. For the subsoil likewise contains strategic materials such as uranium in Seistan and Nuristan. I have described these deposits since 1976 in a report to the Academy of Sciences.

"The important coal deposit of the Indu-Kush and the large copper lode of Ainak near Kabul have been known for 8 years. The Russians dragged out the feasibility studies. Recently they have exploited these veins a bit in the hope of forming a malleable embryo of proletariat in this rural country.

"As for the gas and petroleum of the north, they have wended their way toward the Soviet Union at low prices."

"Why not have exploited these resources instead?"

"Total control of the deposits constituted for the Russians a good way of eliminating all western competition capable of helping Afghanistan rise economically. With petroleum and gas being located near the Soviet border, its exploitation was easy. For the rest, a whole infrastructure of plants and roads was necessary. It was nonexistent and the Russians did not want to set it up until they exercised direct and total control over the country."

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AFGHANISTAN

NEWSMAN DESCRIBES EVERYDAY ATMOSPHERE IN KABUL

Hamburg DER STERN in German 17 Jul 80 pp 149-151

[Report by Rainer Wolfgramm: "Tomorrow Is the Day"]

[Text] "Do you speak German?" The boy does not wait for me to answer but quickly turns the corner on his bicycle. I was flabbergasted. I was prepared for just about anything: snipers' bullets, to be hit with a club, a barrage of stones but not a familiar question and something of a friendly welcome.

I went all around the Afghan capital of Kabul for hours, mindful of all the warnings to be careful and, despite the heat, not wearing sandals but shoes with crepe soles to be able to make a faster getaway. Everyone had warned me-- the Germans at the embassy, the Afghans at the Intercontinental where I was the lone paying guest for a time and as such able to enjoy the combined attention of the 300-man staff.

Blond and blue-eyed as I am, I could be taken for a Russian. Jeans as a kind of I.D. denoting Western origins were not really enough; chewing gum would not do either because even "they" do that, one of the waiters informed me. I should avoid narrow streets; I should quickly move on whenever I got to a doorway or a side street or encountered crowds on public squares or at bus stops. I should also watch out for pickpockets, have my passport ready at all times and should not visit tea rooms. When I left the protected confines of my hotel on the hill, I was extremely ill at ease.

At the far end of the hotel driveway there was a restaurant or what passes for one in these parts, with a charcoal grill and a freezer in front of the door. Next to the owner who is sitting on the counter of the cashier's booth with his legs crossed and is fanning the fire with a newspaper there is a water cooler and next to it a cassette recorder turned up much too high. There are four Afghans sitting at the rickety



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tables, two of them young and two somewhat older. In a way, I would want to return their suspicious looks but in that case I need not have gone in. So, I try to relax them and establish contact. I smile broadly and give them a hello which comes out much too loud.

I have the impression that the two older ones are already eyeing me with less suspicion and after I order a cola drink one of them asks: "You American?" Oh no, I say, a German, the genuine article, a "good" German. An Afghan at the airport had warned me against getting confused with Germans from the GDR.

I show them my passport and tell them I am from Hamburg which is a big city with a harbor, about three times as big as Kabul; but there is lots of bad weather there. I feel somewhat ridiculous as I frantically try to get a conversation going. Just the same-- after I have gotten through singing the praises of the weather and the environs of Kabul, one of the two older Afghans shakes my hand and as he leaves the place tells me that things were much better in the old days.

This encouraged me to continue my walk through the inner city. There is an old man standing on a street corner with lots of teeth missing, hawking his wares. From among the odds and ends he has ranging from plastic combs to water faucets and gauze bandages I select a pair of shoe laces, revising the price upward to 10 Afghanis which comes to about 45 pfennigs.

A week later, I am rewarded for my generosity. The street at the mosque is closed. There is a large funeral but no one will tell me who is at the center of these masses of police and army personnel. In the side streets, Soviet soldiers are beginning to eye me suspiciously; they are being held in reserve on their trucks, ready for action if needed.

I am about to beat a retreat when I spy the old vendor. I can understand him better this time. He tells me that there was heavy fighting west of Kabul in the provincial capital of Bahmyan and that it is the local Afghan commandant who is being buried. 15,000 rebels, he says in his cute brand of English, attacked Bahmyan and many hundred of them were killed. "But," he adds with a note of triumph, "thousands of Russkies were killed!"

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If one took the tales of Afghan courage at face value, then the entire Soviet army would be wiped out already. The BBC, Kabul's prime source of information whose word is taken as the gospel, raised the question in a Farsi broadcast as to how many Soviet troops are needed to exercise genuine control over Afghanistan. The 700,000-man figure mentioned in the broadcast is cited by every taxi driver: "The Russians have brought in 700,000 men, but we have already killed 35,000 of them."

Nobody knows where all these troops are supposed to be stationed. There is not even a real way of telling just how many Soviet troops and tanks are stationed in and around Kabul. Some tens of thousands of the 80,000 total throughout the country are likely to be located in huge, fortified camps all around the city and above all at the airport which is under such heavy security as though an attack by the entire American air force were expected at any time. There are anti-aircraft guns, radar installations and infantry positions there. But on the streets, the occupiers are rarely to be seen.

Public buildings, roads and main squares are being guarded by the meager remnants of the Afghan army, which has been decimated by desertions. These "armed forces" do not inspire fear-- with their torn loafers, their patched uniforms, their Kalashnikovs' muzzles adorned with flowers and their T-52 museum piece tanks.

The Soviet soldiers, who do not take up their posts in Kabul until dark, look fine by comparison-- their broad-brimmed pith helmets making them appear a cross between the Canadian Mounties and American cowboys. They patrol the city during the curfew between 11 pm and 3.30 am. During the day, they take sunbaths, lying on their T-62 tanks at the airport or in the hills around Kabul, wearing nothing but swimming trunks and a hat.

On evenings in the middle of May I could only see Afghan tanks at major intersections and at the old summer residence of Paghman. It was not until the beginning of June that the Soviets returned there. This got the rumor mill going again. In the refugee and rebel camps along the Afghan-Pakistani border it was said the Russians were about to mount a major offensive from Kabul directed at the border in order to inflict a decisive defeat on the rebels. "Tomorrow is the day," I was told in Peshawar, "or the day after; but we will beat

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them back." Two days later, in Kabul, I was told the exact opposite. In the bazaars they were saying: "There are 20,000 rebels standing at the city gates. Tomorrow is the day, or the day after.

That is typical for the state of affairs in the Afghan capital: each week at least two dates are mentioned on which something is supposed to happen. It has been this way since March; until the end May at least the announcements of upcoming student demonstrations were correct.

But since then there have been no confrontations in Kabul; one is waiting for the big explosion. Young people hardly go out nights any more for fear of being pressed into army service. The older ones remain quiet in order not to be considered part of the opposition. Twice appointments of mine fell through because the people I was to meet had just been thrown in jail.

The ten German instructors who teach natural science and German at an Afghan secondary school told me that their students have been refusing instruction following the youth protests in early June. This has nothing to do with the subject matter and even less with the German instructors. Since the two top students of each graduating class receive a scholarship for study in the FRG, the incentive to learn is rather considerable.

On the street and in the tearooms, which I did dare to enter after all, people tell me about friends they have living in German cities and ask me, as soon as they ascertain that I am really not a "Russky," whether one can find work in Germany as an Afghan and whether I can help them get out of Kabul.

Once, when I got 15 kilometers out of the city in a taxi, we were shot at. I crouched on the floor of the cab and had enough time to think about my carelessness in leaving the capital without a special permit. The driver, who had run away immediately, finally returned in the company of an Afghan armored reconnaissance car.

One evening, I am about to order something to drink in a restaurant. One of the billiard players turns around and raises his cue as if he were about to strike me. "Come off it," I say somewhat worriedly in German. And that does the trick. The man asks me where I come from and

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whether I would not want to join their game; tea is on the house. Afterwards I ask them whether they were really about to hit me with the cue. There is an awkward silence, and then the one who raised the cue says: "We have run out of chalk. So, we have to rub the cue against the whitewashed ceiling instead."

As I leave, I ask them whether they have ever had one of the occupiers enter the stall. If he had, we would have beaten him to death with our cues, the Afghans assure me.

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IRAN

IRAN'S ARABS SEEN NO BETTER OFF UNDER KHOMEYNI THAN UNDER SHAH

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 9-15 May 80 pp 24-25

[Article by Political Editor: "Arabestan For Whom?"]

[Text] The Iranian embassy operation in London was only a small episode in the struggle of an Arab people suffering from oppression and subjugation for generations under Farsi hegemony. What about this people? What are its hopes and aspirations? How does it view the present Khomeyni regime in Iran?

The hostage-taking at the Iranian embassy in London was just one more tragedy in the history of Arabestan, the Arab region of Iran. It was plain from the first moment that the western information agencies, including the British and American ones, were against the armed men who carried out the operation, their demands and their cause. They concentrated the camera lights and lenses on the faces of the Farsi Iranians who waved their fists, reviling the armed men from the streets, and who then lost no time in kneeling theatrically on the ground when the cameras approached them, to claim that they were praying.

Before the British commando soldiers stormed the embassy, the armed Arabs complained about the attitude of British information, in particular BBC Radio, for its disgraceful bias against them.

Then came the official British storming, which led to the killing of 5 persons, 3 of them armed men, and 2 hostages, and the wounding of others.

The surprising thing was that right after the operation, Scotland Yard hastened to say that the armed men had executed two hostages about an hour before the storming, whereas none of the correspondents, journalists or eyewitnesses supported this claim with the exception of the Scotland Yard men.

Obviously, the announcement of the execution and its attribution to the armed Arabs was intended to cover up the loss of life which resulted from the British commandos' storming the embassy. Also, Scotland Yard refused

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to say whether the two explosions which occurred during the official storming were the work of the armed men or the result of the explosives planted by the commandos, which exposed the lives of all the hostages to danger.

#### Khomeyni Was Paying the Arabs Evil for Good

The struggle of the Arabs in Iran is not recent, but goes back several centuries. If we consider recent history, i.e. since the success of the Khomeyni revolution, we find that the Arabs of Arabestan had been repaid evil for good.

The Arabs had played a principal part in the Iranian people's struggle to overthrow the Shah's regime. If the Arab workers at the oil installations and shipping ports had not gone on strike, the Khomeyni revolution would not have been able to achieve such rapid victory.

But when the Arabs renewed their demands, like the other Iranian minorities, for autonomy in the context of a confederation including all the Iranian peoples, they met with procrastination on the part of the Khomeyni regime. When they pressed their demands, they met with total rejection, and their religious leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Shubayr al-Khaqani, was arrested and placed under house arrest near Khomeyni's home in Qom. He spent about a year in prison, even though he was advanced in years and his health was deteriorating.

Thus, the Arabs found that the only recourse was to return to a negative stand. Arabestan, the country's oil-rich region, has seen Arab fedayeen operations against government buildings and oil company pipelines since April of last year.

The operations began in al-Muhammarah (Khoramshahr), the country's main port. The men of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) replied with retaliatory operations resulting in 99 Arab victims. From that time on, fedayeen activity became totally secret. Hardly a day passed without a bomb being thrown at a government building, a pipeline, or an oil organization. The operations were also directed at railroad lines.

With the increase in Arab fedayeen operations, official retaliatory campaigns intensified. A large number of young Arabs were executed at the hands of Revolutionary Guard militias after speedy, superficial trials.

The demands of the Arabs in Arabestan included the right to use Arabic in their official regional dealings, and the right to manage their own educational and health affairs, to protect their linguistic and cultural heritage, and to allocate a portion, however insignificant, of the oil revenues from their land for improving their social and living conditions. In other words, they are demanding autonomy, but have expressed no desire for separations.

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The fact is, Arabestan's Arabs exist in painful social circumstances, and are suffering from miserable poverty. They live right next to pipelines in huts made of sheet metal or clay, amid demonstrations of hatred and racism against them. In al-Muhammarah, for example, the Shah's regime intended to build a high wall to block off the sight of Arab huts from people passing along the main street of Iran's largest commercial port.

The Arabs make up about 80 percent of the workers in oil fields, oil industries and loading ports, including Kharg Island and the port of Abadan, which has the largest oil refinery in the world.

Most of the 2 million Arabs are illiterate. They suffer from bitterness in the face of racial discrimination against them, since their wages are not comparable to those of Farsi or foreign workers, and the road to promotion and advancement is blocked to them.

Acts of violence from that time until now have led to the killing of 500 Arabs, the wounding of another 320, and the arrest of 700 strugglers. Most of the dead fell during the governorship of Admiral Ahmed Madani, commander of the Iranian navy and governor of the province, who resigned his post to nominate himself for republican presidency in the elections in which he was defeated by his rival Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, who enjoys Khomeyni's confidence.

Arabestan covers about 165,000 square kilometers. In addition to the Arabs, about 500,000 Farsis live there, their numbers increasing day by day. The most important cities of the region are Ahvaz, al-Muhammarah, and Abadan. Arabestan borders Iran along borders extending for 300 kilometers.

#### A Deep-rooted Arab History

The roots of the Arabs in Arabestan (Khuzestan in Farsi) go back to well-known historic tribes such as the Bani Ka'b, the Bani Tarf, al-Muhaysin and Rabi'ah, most of which migrated to the region before Islam. Then the Arab character of Ahvaz (another name of Arabestan) was confirmed after the Arab Islamic conquest which inflicted a crushing defeat on the Persians.

The Arab Islamic era enriched the region, especially with irrigation projects, the traces of which still exist. Political disturbances occurred during the 'Abbasid caliphate, principally represented by the Zanj revolt in Basrah, which spread throughout the region.

During the past few centuries, with the decline of the Arab and Islamic kingdoms, waves of piracy and maritime and land raiding prevailed throughout the region. In this field, the Ka'b tribe, which came from the central Arabian Peninsula, became notorious. This tribe defied the British, who sought the aid of the Ottomans against it, to no avail.

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When the Ottoman state was unable to subdue Ahvaz, it gave up and induced the Persian government to control it. A treaty unjust and unfair to the Arabs was drawn up in 1848 between the two states, known as the Erzurum Treaty. This treaty allowed the Persians scope to extend their control bit by bit over the region, in the face of violent Arab resistance.

Arabestan witnessed violent revolts against Persian control. Its last Arab ruler, Amir Khaz'al, concluded treaties in its name with a number of states, in order to ensure the region's international identity.

Among the treaties signed by Amir Khaz'al was one with Britain after the discovery of oil, granting it the use of Abadan Island to build an oil refinery. From this it is clear that the Persians did not have a privileged position in Arabestan, and that they gained this position gradually, by force of domination and hegemony. When Iran's fear of Shaykh Khaz'al intensified, Reza Pahlavi, the father of the deposed Shah of Iran, resorted to subterfuge. He kidnaped Amir Khaz'al, imprisoned him, and then killed him in prison in 1936.

After that, there were Arab revolts against Persian rule, the most important ones being the Ka'b al-Dubays tribal revolts of 1940 and the Shaykh Jasim ibn Khaz'al revolt of 1943. The Persians also executed Muhyi-al-Din Al Nasir, head of the National Committee to Liberate Arabestan, in 1964.

Today, the Arab resistance organizations in Arabestan are stressing their determination to continue their struggle until their goals are achieved. The most prominent such organizations are the "Mujahidin Movement of the Arab Moslem People," the "Mass Movement of Arabestan," and the "Political Organization for the Arab People of Arabestan."

Perhaps the least the Arabs of Arabestan can say to any visitor when expressing their bitterness is, "We are the ones who produce the petroleum, and nevertheless look at where we are--clay huts without water, electricity, roads, doctors or schools."

The re-appearance of nationalist feelings in Arabestan is embodied in the aspirations of a sizeable minority with its own heritage, history and pride, which feels that it has been long subjected to humiliation. Just when it thought that the opportunity had arrived to attain some of its desires, it found that the present rulers, whom it had supported and backed, are no less racist and hostile than the fallen Shah-in-Shah regime.

Here the depth of the feelings of hatred which the Persians harbor towards the Arabs can be attested to by what Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Qotbzadeh said when he heard that the armed men at the Iranian embassy were demanding the release of 91 Arabs detained in the prisons of the Iranian "Islamic Regime." His reply was that his government would rather kill the detainees than release them.



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In any case, there is little hope that the existing Iranian regime will meet the Arab demand for autonomy, even though it has acceded to the demands of other minorities such as the Kurds, Baluchis, Turkomans and Azarbayjanis. This is because Arabestan is floating on a sea of petroleum, and the petroleum industry is located there. Through Arabestan's ports Iran can reach the Gulf, which it considers its maritime outlet. Therefore the Arabs of Ahvaz realize that they are facing a long, grim, difficult struggle. They look to their brothers in the Arab World to help them attain their demand for autonomy, even if that comes within a political framework encompassing all the Iranian people.

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IRAN

CLERGY REPORTEDLY INSURING CLAIMS TO POWER

LD281351 London THE TIMES in English 26 Jul 80 p 4

[Special Correspondent Report: "'Quiet Coup' by the Iranian Clergy Has President Bani-Sadr as its First Target"]

[Text] A quiet coup is how some highly placed men, in both government and opposition, are describing the recent consolidation of the Iranian clergy's power at the expense of their more conventional political colleagues.

The "coup" is primarily aimed at President Bani-Sadr and his circle of young advisers, who see their office as that of the chief executive of the land, but the hardline clergy are aiming at more than just removing or subduing Mr Bani-Sadr.

They mean to neutralize all alternative claimants to power and to obtain acceptance for the interpretation of the constitution that makes the unelected clergy the highest source of political power in the country and not the elected president or parliament.

The "coup" is taking the form of threatening government ministers with arrest on charges of having been involved in the recent unsuccessful military plot, or ransacking the homes of opposition figures.

The recent outbursts of Ayatollah Khomeyni, in which he has called into question the revolutionary and religious credentials of the ministers, seems to have been the green light that the Islamic Republican Party, under Ayatollah Beheshti, has been waiting for. The Islamic Republican Party is further helped by the emotional atmosphere of the holy month of Ramadan, and the shock of the discovery of a military plot, to move in for the final kill against all those who do not share its vision of the universe.

Thus, Mr Jalaleddin Farsi, one of the party's most sectarian leaders, has emerged as the most likely choice of parliament as prime minister. A dozen homes in Tehran belonging to prominent Qashqai families have been ransacked, despite the danger of a full rebellion by 10,000 Qashqai tribesmen in central Iran, and it has been proposed in parliament that the opposition groups, the Liberal National Front, the left-wing Muslim Mojahedin guerrillas, and the Marxist Feda'in guerrillas, should be declared illegal.

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ISRAEL

ABBA EBAN ADVISES WESTERN ALLIANCE MEMBERS TO WORK TOGETHER

LD051213 London THE TIMES in English 5 Aug 80 Europa Supplement p 1

[Article by Abba Eban: "Clouds That Darken the Diplomatic Horizon"]

[Text] There is something bizarre in the spectacle of Western Europe asking itself how much support it should be giving the United States on Afghanistan and Iran. Anyone would think that these were particularly American concerns.

The integrity of the diplomatic system, at stake in the seizure of hostages in Iran, is one of the more distinguished products of European creativity. In a rational world we should expect to find Europe anxiously urging the United States to show more excitement and rigour about events in Southern Asia, while America would be affecting a posture of irritating detachment.

The strange idea that America is central--and Europe marginal--in the Afghan crisis is only one of the many clouds of paradox that darken the Western alliance. It would be naive to call Afghanistan a blessing in disguise: the disguise is so thick as to be almost impenetrable. But the episode does have illustrative effects, enabling lessons to be drawn at a price that is painful without being totally insupportable. It is as though the salient weaknesses of the democratic family were all illuminated in a single compact case history.

On the crucial psychological plane the chief Western weakness is a failure of self-esteem. I am not referring to the personal moods of the seven leaders who assembled in Venice in June: few of them are inhibited by an unreasonable measure of humility, but they seem to have no consciousness of their own predominance within the international power system.

The seven countries have a combined population of 600 million, with a gross product, a range of technical equipment and skills, a scientific lineage and resource, and a social dynamic far beyond those commanded by the historic coalition elements of the past. In all the elements of geopolitical strength the seven and their democratic friends tower high above the Soviet Union. Moscow should be worrying about what the West is up to, rather than the other way about.

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The material advantage of the West is compounded by an ideological superiority which Western leaders seldom articulate. Seventy years after its revolution, the Soviet Union does not feel secure enough to open itself to intellectual freedom and dissent. There have been movements of people away from Cuba, East Germany and the Soviet Union towards America and Western Europe; nobody in his right mind could imagine a voluntary movement in the contrary direction.

Yet the Western leadership has no proselytizing spirit and few expressions of institutional pride. The French and American revolutions were lit by flashes of documentary lightning, but in recent times the Western intellectual community, with some noble exceptions such as Raymond Aron, have shown excessive deference to communist systems of thought that have been refuted both by sociological research and by failure in the test of life and action.

On the intellectual plane the Western leaders suffer from their distrust of conceptual analysis. Their responses to crisis have been episodic and improvised. The Western agenda is dictated by yesterday's headlines. The deeper questions are not answered for the reason that they are not asked.

What is the precise nature of the "power" that constitutes the central theme of international relationships: What has "detente" turned out to mean after a decade of experience? What actions can it manage to accommodate and what actions reduce its pretensions to absurdity?

And what is meant by "alliance?" Here the problem is to find the point of harmony between two ideas that are not intrinsically harmonious--the idea of solidarity and the idea of independence.

The need to define "power" arises in the context of the fashionable wisdom that tells us that the military argument has lost its place at the top. It is said that something that is not rationally usable, or which is not in fact brought to use, ceases to be power in any operative sense. We are told that there is a disposition of international society against armed conflict, and that the military power of great states is less decisive as a form of influence.

Now all this would be excellent doctrine for the West--if it were shared by the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union is no longer content with military power as a shield of its own security and environment. Its military thinking is not regional and protective: It is global and expansive.

The West has gravely underestimated the symbolic, and therefore the political, effects of power that is not likely to be often used. The most farreaching example is the refusal of the European community to maintain conventional forces equal to those of the Soviet Union, which the EEC exceeds in population and productivity. The prudish European approach to this element of power commits Europe to a tutelary status in relation to the United States. Such a relationship is bound to be charged with frustration and mutual grievance, without the excuse of objective necessity.

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In their attitude to "detente" Western statesmen and scholars may have shown too much deference to semantic definitions. The sequence of "cold war" to "detente" has no dates, no signposts and no criteria telling us when, how or even if, one of them ended and the other began to dawn. In each case we are describing an adversarial relationship held under certain restraints. Is it really important to express this condition by a single fashionable phrase?

The question is not whether Russian actions in Vietnam, Angola, Yemen, the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan are reconcilable with the word "detente" but whether they are acceptable in terms of international stability and peace, irrespective of what they are called another question for the 1980's is whether the insistence on a label for every epoch does not do offence to the essential volatility and diversity of international experience.

"Alliance" is an older word than "detente," but those who cherish it will have to give it greater clarity than in the 1970's. America tried hard to help Europe to become independent, but now reacts like a parent resenting the adult status of its progeny. Europe enjoys its welfare and prosperity under the American security umbrella, but does not recognize a duty to share America's anxieties about non-European predicaments. It does not even agree to abstain from interfering in arduous American efforts to bring about a Middle Eastern settlement on a basis that has been successful in the recent past.

There is a less lucid sense of alliance than in the 1960's. Charles de Gaulle understood that the Berlin blockade and the Cuban missile crisis were points at which the delights of individualism had to give way to the principle of solidarity. Nobody knows where, if anywhere, his successors in Europe see that point to lee.

It may be that the alliance will be more successful in the test of action than in defining its own terms. Here the test lies in the economic targets which were well defined at Venice. To reduce the dependence on oil and increase the role of other energy sources is not utopian in the dimension described at Venice.

The question is whether the prospect is credible in the eyes of OPEC countries. If it is, then the effects will become operative long before the 1990 targets are reached. If OPEC comes to believe that the oil consumers will be less vulnerable 10 years from now, its appetite for exorbitant oil prices will be tamed from the moment that the belief takes root. Instead of a reckless price spiral, a mood of "sell while you can" will prevail. In the every equation, as in the arms race, your power is what your adversary or partner believes it to be.

The participants in the senice meeting gave great attention to each other's domestic preoccupations. The classic illusion according to which governments

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are the only actors in the international system, gave way to a realistic intuition that diplomacy is losing its reserved status. After Suez, Algeria, Vietnam, Iran and Afghanistan public opinion in the chief Western countries became acutely aware of the fallibility of foreign policy establishments. There is little tendency any longer to leave it all to a Mandarin class or to the workings of royal or presidential prerogative.

Many of the Venice participants were looking over their own and each other's shoulders towards areas of decision that lay beyond their august control. The small but powerful group of nations that practice democracy will have to act more and more like a family, involved, whether they like it or not, in each others intimate concerns. They will have to institutionalize their encounters, to enlarge their theoretical content and to give their dialog more coherence and depth.

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MAURITANIA

SIGNER OF AGREEMENT WITH POLISARIO JOINS AMD

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Jul 80 pp 38-39

[Interview with Col Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi by Abdelaziz Dahmani, June 1980, Paris]

[Text] The Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania (AMD) was born on 22 May in Paris and several African capitals. Its promoters and members included politicians from different backgrounds, but officers as well. Their purpose? To put a halt to the host of coups d'etat which the country has experienced since the overthrow of Mokhtar Ould Daddah on 10 July 1978 and restore civilian rule.

As soon as it was created, the AMD was joined by one of the highest ranking officers in the Mauritanian Army, Col Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi, who came from Dakar, which he had reached by sneaking across the Senegal River (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1013). On that same day, moreover, among other "defectors" was Mauritania's ambassador to Kuwait, Mohamed Abderrahman Ould Amine, who headed for Paris. Colonel Ould Sidi's defection did not go unnoticed in Nouakchott, where the press and radio were instructed to be discreet about the matter. Furthermore, on 30 May, the Council of Ministers decided, following lively debate, to limit departures to foreign countries (France, Morocco, Senegal mainly), even those of official personalities, concerning whom it is no longer known which ones can be considered "trustworthy."

Nor was Colonel Ould Sidi the first to arrive. On behalf of Mauritania, he signed the peace agreement with the POLISARIO in Algiers (5 August 1979), which agreement was the framework of the new regime's policy. The first vice president of the Military Council born of the coups d'etat of 10 July 1978, he was looked upon as the successor to the presidency occupied by Colonel Bousseif (dead in an accident at the end of May 1979).

In truth, Colonel Ould Sidi played no role in the ouster of Mokhtar Ould Daddah. The move of his comrades in the army even surprised him when, having traded his uniform for a *boubou*, he was accompanying a young relative to the airport. After being kept under surveillance for 3 hours -- like everyone else -- he was named that evening, in spite of himself, the number two

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man of the regime, with the task of explaining the underlying reasons for the putsch to French President Giscard d'Estaing.

Born in Mederdra, this son of the emir of Trarza is now 41 years old. He studied at the French military schools of Saint-Maixent and Saint-Cyr Coetquidan beginning in 1960. Upon his return to Mauritania, he became a unit commanding officer and then prefect, particularly at Bir Moghreïn (in the north), regional governor, deputy chief of staff and commanding officer of the Atar Interservice Academy. He has now broken with the junta governing in Nouakchott "because," he says, "we must prevent the Mauritanian nation from being destroyed by the incompetents now leading it."

It was in a small Parisian hotel that I talked with him at the beginning of June 1980. He was accompanied by Mohamed Ould Jiddou, coordinator of the AMD, and Colonel Kader, formerly commander in chief of the air force. In a world exclusive, he described the circumstances under which the famous accord between Mauritania and the POLISARIO was signed.

[Question] You signed the Algiers accord. How were negotiations conducted?

[Answer] I had previously gone to Algeria twice, on 30 June and 17 July, to discuss it, not with the POLISARIO Front but with the Algerian Government. My interlocutors were Col Kasdi Mesbah, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, minister counselor to the president, and Mohamed Sadek Benyahia, minister of foreign affairs. Our purpose was to make the POLISARIO, which had become too greedy, more reasonable. However, despite perfect courtesy, the Algerians were too demanding. They wanted nothing less than the overturning of alliances, recognition of the SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] before the 16th summit conference of the OAU in Monrovia (July 1979), almost immediate evacuation of the part of the Sahara occupied by Mauritania and denunciation of the Madrid accords of 14 November 1975. Therefore, no understanding was reached with the Algerians.

Upon my return to Nouakchott, I reported the failure of the negotiations to Prime Minister Khouna Ould Haidalla, who was leaving for Monrovia (17-20 July). On his return, he submitted to the CMSN (Military Committee for National Salvation) the framework for an agreement with the POLISARIO which he had negotiated in the Liberian capital with Algeria and the Front. I was once again appointed to go to Algiers to put the accord in final form. I was accompanied by Lt Col Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, chief of staff. I did not have the slightest margin in which to maneuver. In particular, I was not empowered to ask the POLISARIO for the release of our prisoners, who numbered in the hundreds.

[Question] Some Mauritaniens have described the accord as "capitulation."

[Answer] I am a military man; I obeyed. But I have the feeling that the agreement prevented Mauritania from having another war because the threat was never removed. It is true that we had more cards in our hand in order to negotiate better.

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[Question] There has been a great deal of talk of secret clauses.

[Answer] There is one that goes as follows: "Mauritania pledges to withdraw permanently, in 7 months, from that part of the Sahara under Mauritanian administration and turn it directly over to the POLISARIO." The Front first wanted immediate restitution. Then it was a matter of 3 months. We asked for a year, hoping that something would happen in that time. Finally, we agreed on 7 months. That was hard.

[Question] Could that "something" have been the occupation of Tiris el-Gharbia by Morocco?

[Answer] No. A better framework for peace, a more general framework with which many foreign ministries are now struggling.

[Question] Was the restitution to take place after a referendum?

[Answer] No, without any type of consultation at all. The clause was to remain secret until the end.

[Question] Why were these agreements signed in Algiers and not elsewhere, in Tripoli, for example?

[Answer] We had no choice about the place. The POLISARIO wanted the Libyans to attend. We refused. The presence of the Algerians was understandable because the signing took place in their country.

[Question] It has been said that Mauritania managed to keep La Guera, a small port necessary for the security of Nouadhibou, but which is not part of the 1960 borders.

[Answer] The accord stipulated that Mauritania does not have and will never have any claims on the Sahara. La Guera remains to be situated geographically and we have yet to conclude....

[Question] It would appear that Ahmed Baba Miske played a discreet role in the conclusion of the agreement.

[Answer] I know that he was at Haidalla's side in Monrovia. The day of our departure for Algiers, via Paris, he tried to contact me from Dakar. He was also in Paris. We avoided one another. In Algiers, the Algerian protocol ended up by imposing him on us. He was in the room at the time of the signing. To my astonishment, the head of the POLISARIO delegation told me: "He is no longer with us; talk to the Algerians."

[Question] Is there room in the region for two Saharan countries, Mauritania also being a Saharan country?

[Answer] I do not believe so!

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[Question] At the rate things are going, it is the one in the north, the SDAR, that may well impose itself.

[Answer] Or else the one in the south will "eat up" the other. Or they might eat each other up and nothing will be left but two cadavers.

[Question] There is a great deal of talk of a "weathervane" policy of Mauritania at the present time.

[Answer] Mauritania has become an object sold to the highest bidder, that someone takes before the sale is even completed in order to try to resell it to others! It has become a stake that is fought over in the embassies and the foreign ministries.

[Question] How do the "buyers" behave?

[Answer] They no longer understand. They have become reticent because of "the devaluation of the merchandise" being offered to them.

[Question] Was the Military Council in on the negotiations for the release of Mokhtar Ould Daddah?

[Answer] Several days after his release, at the beginning of October 1979, members of the Military Committee for National Salvation still believed that President Mokhtar was still being held in Oualata! You can see the kind of confidence that reigned among the military officers.

[Question] Why do you want the departure of the officers still in power?

[Answer] Their main defect is impatience, plus their total lack of understanding of the economy, education and other serious problems.

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MOROCCO

CEDIES ISSUES ANNUAL ECONOMY REVIEW

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16, 23 May 80

[16 May 80, pp 1145-1146]

[Text] As it does every spring, CEDIES, organ of CGEM (Moroccan General Economic Confederation), has done a survey during recent weeks of the evolution of the national economy over the past year. We are commencing here with the first part of its "Provisional Balance Sheet for 1979" which is devoted to the principal indicators: Gross domestic production; gross formation of fixed capital; industrial investments; foreign trade; the monetary situation; credits and prices; tourism. We shall follow up with a sectoral analysis of the results: agriculture, mining, energy and industry.

In its introduction CEDIES undertakes to explain the economic evolution of Morocco during 1979 in the light of several essential aspects of the global context and the constraints they impose upon the country's economic policy; upheaval in the world economy; the costs ensuing from the Saharan war; achievements under the 1973-77 plan. The policy of austerity adopted in June 1978 continued to weigh heavily upon the general economic activity, which has felt the effects of the various restrictive measures adopted. Despite a perceptible improvement in the conjuncture, the results obtained in 1979 did not realize the objectives set by the triennial plan for 1978-80.

Gross Domestic Production

Estimated in 1969 prices (the new basis for national accounting), the gross domestic production increased in 1979 to 30,888 million dirhams, representing a growth on the order of 3.2 percent, pretty much the same as that of the preceding year (3.1 percent).

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Table 1  
Gross Domestic Production  
(in millions of dirhams)

	1977	%	1978	%	1979	%	Variations % 1979-1978
Agriculture	3,538	12.2	4,182	14	3,931	12.7	- 6
Mining	901	3.1	960	3.2	1,015	3.3	+ 5.7
Energy	1,061	3.6	1,115	3.7	1,473	4.8	+32.1
Industry	4,802	16.5	5,070	16.9	5,191	16.8	+ 2.4
Buildings and Public Works	2,414	8.3	1,967	6.6	1,870	6.1	- 5
Transportation and Communications	1,248	4.3	1,392	4.6	1,460	4.7	+ 4.9
Trade and services	10,035	34.6	10,150	33.9	10,349	33.5	+ 2
Public administration	3,622	12.5	3,972	13.3	4,434	14.4	+11.6
Taxes and duties	1,401	4.8	1,124	3.7	1,163	3.8	+ 3.5
Total	29,022		29,932		30,886		+ 3.2

Note: Provisional figures for 1979; 1 dirham = 1.10 F

This stability in the growth rate, as CEDIES emphasizes, takes in variations in various sectoral evolutions, either increases or decreases.

The agricultural sector is notably on the decline, with a regression of 6 percent. This is due once more to the harvest of cereal grains which recorded a new drop of 13 percent in comparison with that of 1978, although less of a drop than in past years (41 million quintals as opposed to around 47 million for the preceding year). The share of agriculture in the Gross Domestic Production [PIB], which had mounted to 14 percent in 1978, thus retreated to only 12.7 percent in 1979.

The second sector on the decline is that of buildings and public works. This last has experienced a continuous retraction for 2 years, registering a decline of 18.5 percent in 1978 and 5 percent in 1979.

All the other sectors exhibit, on the contrary, a growth more or less pronounced in contrast to that of the preceding year. The most noteworthy change of pace is doubtless that of the energy sector with a rise of 32.1 percent following the rise in cost of petroleum fueled energy and the development in production of electrical energy which improved by 9.4 percent in 1979.

As for the other activities, the mining sector seems to preserve an average rate of growth hovering around 6 percent. But as for industrial activities one observes rather a slowing down, with a rate which barely reaches 2.4 percent in 1979 as against 5.6 percent the previous year.

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The chief cause for this lies in the slackening domestic demand and its effects on certain activities, such as automobile assembly.

This situation characteristic of the industrial sector seems equally to have dominated the transportation sector, the growth of which was drastically reduced in 1979 in comparison with the previous year's rate at 4.9 percent, against 11.5 percent for 1978.

Finally, the sectors of commerce and services, which account for a third of the PIB, could only register a slight advance with a rate of 2 percent against 1.2 percent for the preceding year, rates which remain short of the expansion in earlier years.

## Gross Formation of Fixed Capital

The gross formation of fixed capital reached 13.230 million dirham in 1979 as against 13,400 million dirham in 1978, which marks a decline of 1.3 percent, clearly less significant than that registered the year before (-12.7 percent).

This decline can be attributed to a decline in investments in materiel and machinery (-6.5 percent) and in building (-13 percent). On the other hand investments in public works seems to have taken on an accelerated pace on the order of 21 percent. It is to be recalled that it was these latter activities that were most affected by the policy of austerity initiated in 1978 (a drop of more than 25 percent). This situation would therefore appear to have redressed the balance somewhat with the resumption of programs aimed at outfitting the State enterprises.

Table 2 Gross Formation of Fixed Capital  
(in millions of dirhams)

	1977		1978		1979		Variations % 1979-1978
		%		%		%	
Materiel and machinery	6,474	42	4,749	35.5	4,440	34	- 6n5
Building	3,885	25	4,736	35.5	4,120	31	-13
Public works	4,417	29	3,282	24	3,970	30	+21
Equipment, plantations, livestock	573	4	633	5	700	5	+10.6
Total	15,349		13,400		13,230		- 1.3

## Industrial Investments

With regard to industrial investments, the number of officially approved projects mounted to 619 during the past year for a total 1,040 million dirhams, the same level recorded during 1978. For the first 2 years of

the transitional three-year plan (1978-1980) industrial investments will thus be stabilized at around 1 billion dirhams a year, as contrasted with an average 2 billion during the 5 year period 1973-77. This decline results from the reduction of State operations and their impact upon the expansion programs of the private sector. But the essential fact with respect to industrialization is the latter's resiliency.

Table 3 Industrial Investments

	Number of projects		Amount of investment (in millions of dh.)			Average investment per project	
	1978	1979	1978	1979	Variation %	1978	1979
Agro-industry	131	163	192	254	+32.3	1.45	1.56
Textiles and leather	106	130	227	179	-21.1	2.04	1.38
Chemical and paracheical	182	204	367	365	0	2.02	1.79
Mechanical and electric	100	122	272	242	-11	2.72	1.98
Industry as a whole	519	619	1058	1040	- 1.7	2.01	1.68

In the sectoral scheme of things only one sector has recorded a progressive volume of investment. All the other sectors are as it were stabilized (as with the chemical and paracheical sector) or on a decline (textiles and the mechanical, metallurgical and electrical industries).

#### Foreign Trade

At 7 billion dirhams the deficit in the balance of trade in 1979 shows a deterioration of 14 percent in comparison to the corresponding deficit of the preceding year (6 billion dirhams). This development reflects a new increase in tonnage of imports, which has been substantially reduced in 1978 and which has served to offset the positive effects of an increasing trend in exports.

Indeed imports have risen 15.8 percent, attaining the sum of 14,300 million dirhams in 1979 as against 12,400 million dirhams in 1978.

This undesired increase in imports stems from a general increase in all headings. But it is especially the importation of products which require a large input of energy (which has nearly doubled in cost) and raw materials which have had the decisive impact on the final figure. On the other hand purchases of food stuffs and manufactured goods have increased only slightly. The share of these last in total imports nevertheless remains determinant.

Moroccan exports have augmented 16.4 percent, pursuing the upward trend which has characterized them for 2 years now. They went from 6,300

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million dirhams in 1978 to 7,300 million dirhams in 1979, due especially to the performance of manufactured products and sales of food stuffs. The former recorded an increase of more than 27 percent and the latter more than 15 percent.

As for phosphates, despite an increase in tonnage exported the total value diminished by 7.7 percent, amounting to 1,878 million dirhams in 1979 as against 2,034 million dirhams for the preceding year.

## The Monetary and Credit Situation; Evolution of Prices

On the monetary front restrictive measures permitted a relaxation in the pace of creating new money to less than 15 percent as compared with 21 percent in 1978. Term deposits and import deposits recorded a significant increase on the order of 20.7 percent, but which constitutes a decrease in comparison to the vigorous expansion which had characterized them following the inauguration of the preliminary deposit [sic, dépôt préalable] and other measures to encourage bank deposits.

With respect to counterparts the chief points concern, on the one hand the worrisome issue of foreign assets (scarcely equivalent to a month's imports) and, on the other hand, the overall improvement in the rate of credits in the economy, which went from 10 percent in 1978 to 13.7 percent in 1979.

Table 4                      Total Money Supply and Counterparts  
(in millions of dirhams)

	1978	1979	Variations % 1979-1978
Total money supply	24,311	27,786	+14.3
Fiduciaries	7,677	9,021	+17.5
Script	12,962	14,333	+10.6
Sight deposits	(10,603)	(11,742)	+10.7
Quasi money (term and import deposits)	3,672	4,432	+20.7
Counterparts	24,311	27,786	+14.3
Foreign assets	1,779	1,648	- 7.3
Credits on the Treasury	13,561	15,428	+13.8
Credits in the economy	9,761	11,100	+13.7
Balance of miscellaneous items	- 790	- 390	-

In so far as price developments are concerned, using as a base an average of indices between January and December 1979, the advance in the cost of living reached 8.3 percent for Morocco as a whole and 7.93 percent for city of Casablanca. These rates constitute a decline in comparison to those established in the course of the two previous years, 9.76 percent

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in 1978 and 12.5 percent in 1977 for Morocco as a whole and 9.6 and 13.67 percent for Casablanca.

## Tourism

In the field of tourism, finally, the year 1979 was characterized by a relative stagnation in the flow of tourists to Morocco. The number of visitors (sojourners and cruise participants) comes to about 1,550,000 tourists, a rise of about 2.4 percent over the preceding year. But if one restricts oneself to solely to sojourners, who constitute the mainstay of touristic activity, one observes that there has actually been a decline in their numbers during 1979. With 1,436,000 tourists as against 1,447,000 in 1978 the decline is certainly slight (-2.8 percent) but it marks a halt in the favorable trend which was discerned during the past 2 years.

In comparison to the trend which had developed by the end of the first semester (a reduction of nearly 18 percent) the results for the entire year 1979 make it apparent that there had been a resurgence of tourist visits during the course of the second semester. But it is a fact that, on the whole the peak of a million and a half visitors reached in 1977 could not be improved upon in 1979. The analysis published by CEDIES denies that this development may be imputed exclusively to the factors of the conjuncture: the crisis which has raged since 1974 and which translates into a near stagnation in the number of tourists; the continual rise in prices, notably the costs of transportation and the unemployment witnessed in European countries; the effects of the disruptions experienced by touristic activity in Spain, through which a good number of the tourists who come to Morocco transit. There are also certain inadequacies, which perhaps show up more in the work of promotion and canvassing in the tourism sector, which has need of a dynamism and a spirit of initiative in greater amounts than the other sectors. Also the sanitation measures which are under way are welcome, considering the objective of two million tourists dictated by the three-year plan which terminates this year.

Table 5 Development of Tourism

	1978	1979	Variations %
Sojourn tourism	1,477,093	1,435,996	- 2.8
Moroccans	362,273	357,988	- 1.2
Foreigners, of which	1,114,820	1,078,008	- 3.3
Arab countries	56,012	47,432	-15.3
French	318,681	323,512	+ 1.5
Spanish	142,816	135,177	- 5.3
German	110,814	103,247	- 6.8
English	111,758	103,512	- 7.4
American	111,267	81,078	-27.1
Cruise Groups	68,667	113,458	+65.2
Total (sojourn plus cruise)	1,545,760	1,549,455	+ 2.4

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[23 May 80, pp 1201-1202]

[Text] An Agricultural Campaign in Retreat

As was already emphasized last week in the analysis of gross domestic production [PIB] agricultural production in 1979 was clearly inferior to that in 1978, so much so that the share of agriculture in the PIB declined from 14 percent to 12.7 percent.

It should be noted that contrary to custom the "Provisional Balance Sheet for 1979" of CEDIES does not deal with either the citrus and early crops or with wine production. We shall return later to these sectors, some of which received brief mention in the introduction: "As regards the agricultural sector, if the decline in citrus and early crop production was compensated for in part by an improvement in foreign exchange rates, the reduction in output of cereal grains resulted in massive importations with a view to insuring the country a normal supply."

#### A Deficit in Cereal Grains of 20 Million Quintals

The 1978-1979 agricultural campaign felt the effects once again of bad climatic conditions. Insufficient rain at the onset of the campaign forced a delay in ploughing, while the attacks of harmful birds must have accounted for losses of between 15 and 20 percent of the cereal grain production. This production has been estimated at 40.7 million quintals as against 46.5 million quintals for the preceding campaign, a decline in production of 12.5 percent.

Considering the needs of Morocco for domestic consumption, estimated at 60 million quintals, the deficit in cereal grains for this campaign comes to around 20 million quintals. The decline in production affected all categories of cereal grains with the exception of soft wheat.

Table 1  
Production of Cereal Grains  
(area planted in 1,000 hectares,  
production in 1,000 quintals)

	1977-1978		1978-1979		Variations %	
	Area planted	Production	Area planted	Production	Area planted	Production
Hard wheat	1,297	14,409	1,167	13,069	-10	- 9.3
Soft wheat	457	4,356	490	4,895	+ 7.2	+12.4
Barley	2,389	23,262	2,168	18,862	- 9.3	-19
Corn	394	3,904	415	3,116	+ 5.3	-20
Other	168	615	145	793	-	-
Total cereal grains	4,705	46,546	4,385	40,735	- 6.8	-12.5

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At 13 million quintals production of hard wheat recorded a decline on the same order (-10 percent) as the decline the area sown. From this fact it can be concluded that the yield of this crop per hectare has remained stationary at around 11 quintals per hectare.

But the most important drop in production was that registered by barley and corn. The former, which in terms of tonnage is the most important cereal grain produced in Morocco has undergone a fall in production of 23.2 million quintals in 1977-78 and at least 19 million quintals during the 1978-79 campaign, a decline of 19 percent. It was the same with corn production (a decline of 20 percent), which fell from 3.9 million quintals in 1977-78 to 3.1 million quintals the following year.

The only positive development in the 1978-79 campaign, finally, was that of soft wheat, production of which advanced 12.4 percent, with almost 5 million quintals as against 4.3 million for the preceding campaign.

The inadequate results in production of cereal grains, aggravated by the hike in costs of the factors of production (price of motor fuels, increase in agricultural salaries, price of fertilizer) motivated the decision of Moroccan authorities to increase the price of cereal grains at the level of the producer: for hard and soft wheat, 105 dirhams per quintal instead of 85 dirhams; for barley and corn 80 dirhams per quintal instead of the previous 60 dirhams (1 dirham equals about 1.10 F).

As for the legumes, production remained stationary at 2.6 million quintals despite a substantial reduction in area of cultivation (-13 percent). In actuality this result stems from an improvement of two thirds in the production of chick peas (75 percent), the other legumes having all lost ground.

Table 2  
Production of Legumes  
(area of cultivation in 1,000 hectares,  
production in 1,000 quintals)

	1977-1978		1978-1979		Variations %	
	Area cultivated	Production	Area cultivated	Production	Area cultivated	Production
Beans	221	1,614	208	1,475	- 5.9	- 8.6
Chick peas	68	367	62	642	- 8.9	+75
Peas	95	457	63	374	-33	-18.2
Lentils	37	211	29	135	-21.7	-36
Other	79	-	73	-	-	-
Total legumes	500	2,649	435	2,626	-13	- 0.9

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Regarding edible oils production, unlike other agricultural production, they turned in a remarkable performance during the 1978-79 campaign. Production reached something like 677,000 quintals, an advance of 57.8 percent in comparison to the previous level (429,000 quintals in 1977-78).

## Industrial Crops Fall Back 10 Percent Across the Board

With respect to the industrial crops, they were likewise affected by bad weather conditions. Production diminished an overall 10 percent, going from 27.5 million quintals in 1977-78 to 24.7 million quintals in 1978-79.

Table 3  
Industrial Crops  
(area of cultivation in 1,000 hectares,  
production in 1,000 quintals)

	1977-1978		1978-1979		Variations %	
	Area cultivated	Production	Area cultivated	Production	Area cultivated	Production
Sugar beets	59	23,954	63	21,745	+ 6.8	- 9.2
Sugar cane	4	3,375	4	2,887	-	-14.5
Cotton	18	169	8	115	-55.6	-32
Total						
Industrial crops	81	27,498	75	24,747	- 7.4	-10

The most important decline was in the production of cotton, which fell from 169,999 quintals to only 115,000 quintals, the acreage devoted to this crop having diminished by more than one half.

Sugar beets, which constitute the principal industrial crop, was happily only slightly affected (-9 percent) in comparison to the 1976-77 campaign, when it fell to less than 15 million quintals. Consequently with 21.7 million quintals in 1978 (as against 23.9 million quintals in 1977-78), sugar beet production, in spite of everything, made it possible to maintain the national level of sugar production.

As for sugar cane, it experienced its first decline after 3 years of vigorous expansion. From 776,000 quintals in 1975-76 it surpassed 3,375,000 quintals in 1977-78, and during the 1978-79 campaign it fell by 14.5 percent to 2,887,000 quintals.

Turning our attention to animal husbandry, the livestock population rose only slightly, from 24,247,000 head to 24,799,000 head, a small increase of 2.3 percent over the previous campaign. Following is a breakdown by species (in thousands of head):

Table 4

	1977-1978	1978-1979
Cattle	2,907	3,089
Sheep	15,272	15,604
Goats	5,972	6,016
Camels	96	90
Total	24,247	24,799

With regard to supervised slaughtering, statistics at the end of September, compared to those for the same period in the preceding year (figures within parentheses) give the following indications: cattle, 451,000 (399,000); sheep, 2,660,000 (2,194,000); goats, 743,000 (593,000), camels, 10,000 (14,000); pigs, 7,000 (7,000); horses, 24,000 (17,000).

Finally, with regard to industrial fishing, the results of the first 11 months of the year disclose a decline of 9.2 percent in tonnage unloaded, which amounts to 198,600 tons, as against 218,700 for the same period of the preceding year.

It was at the Port of Agadir that the fall was most significant (107,400 tons as against 143,700 tons in 1978); whereas at Essaouira the catches were bettered by more than one half (37,800 tons as against 22,800 tons in 1978).

The breakdown for the principal fishing ports is as follows for 1979, by comparison to 1978 (figures within parentheses): Agadir 107,400 tons (143,700 tons); Al Hoceima, 10,700 tons (9,600 tons); Casablanca, 1,200 tons (1,400); Essaouira, 37,800 tons (22,800 tons); Safi, 41,500 tons (41,200 tons).

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